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1Abstract
Arrow’s celebrated theorem of social choice shows that the aggre-
gation of individual preferences into a social ordering cannot make the
ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individual prefer-
ences over that pair, unless the fundamental weak Pareto and non-
dictatorship principles are violated. In the standard model of division
of commodities, we investigate how much information about indiﬀer-
ence hypersurfaces is needed to construct social ordering functions
satisfying the weak Pareto principle and anonymity. We show that
local information such as marginal rates of substitution or the shapes
“within the Edgeworth box” is not enough, and knowledge of substan-
tially non-local information is necessary.
Key words: social choice, preference aggregation, information, in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives, indiﬀerence curves.
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21 Introduction
From Arrow’s celebrated theorem of social choice, it is well known that the
aggregation of individual preferences into a social ordering cannot make the
social ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individual prefer-
ences over that pair (this is the famous axiom of Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives). Or, more precisely, it cannot do so without trespassing basic
requirements of unanimity (the Pareto principle) and anonymity (even in the
very weak version of non-dictatorship). This raises the following question:
What additional information about preferences would be needed in order
to make aggregation of preferences possible, and compatible with the basic
requirements of unanimity and anonymity?
In the last decades, the literature on social choice has explored several
paths and gave interesting answers to this question. The main avenue of
research has been, after Sen [18] and d’Aspremont and Gevers [7], the in-
troduction of information about utilities, and it has been shown that the
classical social welfare functions, and less classical ones, could be obtained
with the Arrovian axiomatic method by letting the social preferences take
account of speciﬁc kinds of utility information.
In this paper, we focus on the introduction of additional information
about preferences that is not of the utility sort. In other words, we retain
a framework with purely ordinal and interpersonally non-comparable prefer-
ences. The kind of additional information that we study is about the shapes
of indiﬀerence curves, and we ask how much one needs to know about in-
diﬀerence curves so as to be able to aggregate individual preferences while
respecting the unanimity and anonymity requirements. The introduction
of this additional information is formulated in terms of weakening Arrow’s
axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives.
The model adopted here is an economic model, namely, the canonical
model of division of inﬁnitely divisible commodities among a ﬁnite set of
agents. We chose to study an economic model rather than the abstract model
that is now commonly used in the theory of social choice1 for two reasons.
First, it allows a more ﬁne-grained analysis of information about preferences,
because it makes it sensible to talk about marginal rates of substitution
and other local notions about indiﬀerence curves. Second, in an economic
1Recollect, however, that Arrow’s initial presentations [1, 2] dealt with this economic
model of division of commodities.
3model preferences are naturally restricted, and by considering a restricted
domain we can hope to obtain positive results with less information than
under unrestricted domain.
Our ﬁrst extension of informational basis is to take account of marginal
rates of substitution. It turns out that such inﬁnitesimally local informa-
tion would not be enough to escape from dictatorship, and we establish an
extension of Arrow’s theorem. Then, it is natural to take account of the
portions of indiﬀerence curves in some ﬁnitely sized neighborhoods of the
allocations. Based on this additional information, we can construct a non-
dictatorial aggregation rule or social ordering function, but still anonymity
cannot be attained.
The second direction of extending informational basis focuses on indif-
ference curves “within the Edgeworth box”. More precisely, for any two
allocations, we deﬁne the smallest vector of total resources that makes both
allocations feasible, and take the portion of the indiﬀerence curve through
each allocation in the region below the vector. The introduction of this kind
of information, however, does not help us avoid dictatorship.
The third avenue relies on some ﬁxed monotone path from the origin in
the consumption space, and focuses on the points of indiﬀerence curves that
belong to this path. The idea of referring to such a monotone path is due to
Pazner and Schmeidler [16], and may be justiﬁed if the path contains relevant
benchmark bundles. Making use of this additional information, and following
Pazner and Schmeidler’s [16] contribution, we can construct a unanimous and
anonymous social ordering function.
Our ﬁnal, the largest, extension of informational basis is to take whole
indiﬀerence curves. Given the above result, a unanimous and anonymous
social ordering function can be constructed on this informational basis.
The motivation for our research draws on many strands of recent and
less recent literature. Attempts to construct social ordering functions and
similar objects embodying unanimity and equity requirements were made
by Suzumura [19, 20] and Tadenuma [21]. The idea that information about
whole indiﬀerence curves is suﬃcient, hinted at by Pazner and Schmeidler
[16] and Maniquet [14], was made more precise in Pazner [15] and was revived
by Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer [4] and Fleurbaey and Maniquet [8,
9] who were able to construct nicely behaved social ordering functions on
this basis. Campbell and Kelly [5] recently studied essentially the same
issue in an abstract model of social choice, and showed that limited infor-
mation about preferences may be enough. However, their model does not
4have the rich structure of economic environments, and they focus only on
non-dictatorship and do not study how much information is needed for the
stronger requirement of anonymity.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the frame-
work and the main notions. The results are presented in Section 3. Section
4 concludes. The appendix contains some proofs.
2 The Model and Axioms
2.1 The model
The population is ﬁxed. Let N = {1,...,n} be the set of agents where
2 ≤ n<∞. There are   goods indexed by k =1 ,...,  where 2 ≤  <∞.
Agent i’s consumption bundle is a vector xi =( xi1,...,xi ). An allocation is
denoted x =( x1,...,xn). The set of allocations is Rn 
+ . The set of allocations
such that no individual bundle xi is equal to the zero vector is denoted X.
A preordering is a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation. Agent i’s
preferences are described by a complete preordering Ri (strict preference Pi,
indiﬀerence Ii)o nR 
+. A proﬁle of preferences is denoted R =( R1,...,Rn).
Let R be the set of continuous, convex, and strictly monotonic preferences
over R 
+.
A social ordering function (SOF) is a mapping ¯ R deﬁned on Rn, such
that for all R ∈R n, ¯ R(R) is a complete preordering on the set of allocations
Rn 
+ . Let ¯ P(R) (resp. ¯ I(R)) denote the strict preference (resp. indiﬀerence)
relation associated to ¯ R(R).
Let π be a bijection on N. For all x ∈ Rn 
+ , deﬁne π(x)=( x 
1,...,x 
n) ∈ Rn 
+
by x 
i = xπ(i) for all i ∈ N, and for all R ∈R n, deﬁne π(R)=( R 
1,...,R 
n) ∈
Rn by R 
i = Rπ(i) for all i ∈ N. Let Π be the set of all bijections on N. The
basic requirements of unanimity and anonymity on which we focus in this
paper are the following.
Weak Pareto: ∀R ∈R n, ∀x,y ∈ Rn 
+ , if ∀i ∈ N,xiPiyi, then x ¯ P(R)y.
Anonymity: ∀R ∈R n,∀x,y ∈ Rn 
+ ,∀π ∈ Π:
x ¯ R(R)y ⇔ π(x) ¯ R(π(R)) π(y).
Concerning the non-dictatorship form of anonymity, we only deﬁne here
what dictatorship means, for convenience. Notice that it has to do only with
allocations in X, that is, without the zero bundle for any agent.
5Dictatorial SOF: ASOF ¯ R is dictatorial if there exists i0 ∈ N such that:
∀R ∈R
n,∀x,y ∈ X : xi0Pi0yi0 ⇒ x ¯ P(R)y.
2.2 Variants of Independence of Irrelevant Alterna-
tives
The traditional, Arrovian, version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
is:
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): ∀R,R  ∈R n, ∀x,y ∈
Rn 
+ , if ∀i ∈ N, Ri and R 
i agree on {xi,y i}, then ¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R ) agree on
{x,y}.
It is possible to weaken IIAby strengthening the premise. This amounts
to allowing the SOF to make use of more information when ranking each pair
of allocations.
First, we consider making use of marginal rates of substitution.
Economists are used to focus on marginal rates of substitution when as-
sessing the eﬃciency of an allocation, especially under convexity, since for
convex preferences the marginal rates of substitution determine the half space
in which the upper contour set lies. Moreover, for eﬃcient allocations, the
shadow prices enable one to compute the relative implicit income shares of
diﬀerent agents, thereby potentially providing a relevant measure of inequal-
ities in the distribution of resources. Therefore, taking account of marginal
rates of substitution is a natural extension of the informational basis of social
choice in economic environments.
Let C(xi,R i) denote the cone of price vectors that support the upper
contour set for Ri at xi :
C(xi,R i)={p ∈ R
 |∀y ∈ R
 
+,py= pxi ⇒ xiRiy}.
When preferences Ri are strictly monotonic, one has C(xi,R i) ⊂ R 
++ when-
ever xi   0.
IIA except Marginal Rates of Substitution (IIA-MRS): ∀R,R  ∈R n,
∀x,y ∈ Rn 
+, if ∀i ∈ N, Ri and R 







6then ¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R ) agree on {x,y}.
Marginal rates of substitution give an inﬁnitesimally local piece of in-
formation about indiﬀerence hypersurfaces at given allocations. Anatural
extension of the informational basis would be to take account of the indiﬀer-
ence hypersurfaces in some ﬁnitely sized neighborhoods of the two allocations.







I(xi,R i)={z ∈ R
 
+ | zI i xi}.
The set I(xi,R i) is called the indiﬀerence set at xi for Ri.
The next axiom of SOFs is deﬁned for a given ε>0. Notice that the
larger (the smaller) is the value of ε, the weaker (the stronger) the condition
becomes.
IIA except Indiﬀerence Sets in ε-Neighborhoods (IIA-ISεN): Let
ε>0 be given. ∀R,R  ∈R n, ∀x,y ∈ Rn 
+ , if ∀i ∈ N, Ri and R 
i agree on
{xi,y i}, and
I(xi,R i) ∩ Bε(xi)=I(xi,R
 
i) ∩ Bε(xi),
I(yi,R i) ∩ Bε(yi)=I(yi,R
 
i) ∩ Bε(yi),
then ¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R ) agree on {x,y}.
The second type of extension of informational basis is to focus on the
portions of indiﬀerence sets which lie “within the Edgeworth box”. However,
when considering any pair of allocations, the two allocations may need diﬀer-
ent amounts of total resources to be feasible. Therefore we need to introduce








Let ω(x,y)=( ω1(x,y),...,ω (x,y)). The vector ω(x,y) ∈ R 
+ represents the






+ | z ≤ ω(x,y)
 
.
7The set Ω(x,y) ⊂ R 
+ is the set of consumption bundles that are feasible
with ω(x,y). The following axiom captures the idea that the ranking of two
allocations should depend only on the indiﬀerence hypersurfaces over the
region satisfying the feasibility constraint.
IIA except Indiﬀerence Sets over Feasible Allocations (IIA-ISFA):
∀R,R  ∈R n, ∀x,y ∈ Rn 
+ , if ∀i ∈ N,
I(xi,R i) ∩ Ω(x,y)=I(xi,R
 
i) ∩ Ω(x,y),
I(yi,R i) ∩ Ω(x,y)=I(yi,R
 
i) ∩ Ω(x,y),
then ¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R ) agree on {x,y}.
It will actually be worth considering weaker variants of this axiom, which
rely on radial expansions of the set Ω(x,y). For any set Y ⊂ R  and any
λ ≥ 1, deﬁne
λY = {q ∈ R
 |λ
−1q ∈ Y }.
The next axiom is deﬁned for a given λ ≥ 1. The larger is the value of λ, the
weaker the axiom becomes.
IIA except Indiﬀerence Sets over λ-Expanded Feasible Allocations
(IIA-ISλEFA): ∀R,R  ∈R n, ∀x,y ∈ Rn 
+ , if ∀i ∈ N,
I(xi,R i) ∩ λΩ(x,y)=I(xi,R
 
i) ∩ λΩ(x,y),
I(yi,R i) ∩ λΩ(x,y)=I(yi,R
 
i) ∩ λΩ(x,y),
then ¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R ) agree on {x,y}.
Combining ε-neighborhoods of two allocations x,y and a radial expansion
of Ω(x,y) as the informational basis, we have the following axiom. Let ε>0
and λ ≥ 1 be given.
IIA except Indiﬀerence Sets in ε-Neighborhoods and over λ-
Expanded Feasible Allocations (IIA-IS[εNλEFA]): ∀R,R  ∈R n,
∀x,y ∈ Rn 
+, if ∀i ∈ N,
I(xi,R i) ∩ [Bε(xi) ∪ λΩ(x,y)] = I(xi,R
 
i) ∩ [Bε(xi) ∪ λΩ(x,y)]
I(yi,R i) ∩ [Bε(yi) ∪ λΩ(x,y)] = I(yi,R
 
i) ∩ [Bε(yi) ∪ λΩ(x,y)],
then ¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R ) agree on {x,y}.
8The third way of extending information about indiﬀerence sets is to rely
on a path
Λω0 = {λω0 ∈ R
 
++ | λ ∈ R+},
where ω0 ∈ R 
++ is ﬁxed, and to focus on the part of the indiﬀerence sets
which belongs to this path. The idea of referring to such a path is due to
Pazner and Schmeidler [16], and may be justiﬁed if the path contains relevant
benchmark bundles. The choice of ω0 is not discussed here, but it need not be
arbitrary. For instance, one may imagine that it could reﬂect an appropriate
equity notion, or it could be the bundle of total resource availability.
IIA except Indiﬀerence Sets on Path ω0 (IIA-ISPω0): ∀R,R  ∈R n,
∀x,y ∈ Rn 
+,i f∀i ∈ N,
I(xi,R i) ∩ Λω0 = I(xi,R
 
i) ∩ Λω0,
I(yi,R i) ∩ Λω0 = I(yi,R
 
i) ∩ Λω0,
then ¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R ) agree on {x,y}.
The ﬁnal extension of informational basis that we consider is to introduce
whole indiﬀerence hypersurfaces. This condition was already introduced and
studied by Hansson [11] in the abstract model of social choice, who showed
that the Borda rule, which does not satisfy the Arrow IIA condition, satisﬁes
this constrained variant thereof. Pazner [15] also proposed it, in a study of
social choice in economic environments.
IIA except Whole Indiﬀerence Sets (IIA-WIS): ∀R,R  ∈R n, ∀x,y ∈
Rn 







then ¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R ) agree on {x,y}.
Lemma 1 Let ε>0 and λ ≥ 1 be given.
IIA-MRS → IIA-ISεN
  
IIA → IIA-ISFA → IIA-ISλEFA → IIA-IS[εNλEFA] → IIA-WIS
  
IIA-ISPω0
93 How large portions of indiﬀerence surfaces
do we have to know?
Let us ﬁrst recall the formulation of Arrow’s theorem for this model (Bordes
and Le Breton [3]).
Proposition 1 If a SOF ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Pareto and IIA, then it is dicta-
torial.
It turns out, unfortunately, that introducing information about marginal
rates of substitution, in addition to pairwise preferences, does not make room
for the existence of satisfactory SOFs. More formally, weakening IIAinto
IIA-MRS does not alter the dictatorship conclusion of Arrow’s theorem.
Proposition 2 If a SOF ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Pareto and IIA-MRS, then it is
dictatorial.
The proof of this Proposition is long and is relegated to the appendix,
but here we sketch the main line of the proof. Since IIAimplies IIA -MRS,
Proposition 2 is a generalization of the theorem by Bordes and Le Breton
[3, Theorem 3]. An essential idea of the proofs of Arrow-like theorems in
economic environments (Kalai, Muller and Satterthwaite [13], Bordes and
Le Breton [3], and others) is as follows: First, we ﬁnd a “free triple”, that
is, three allocations for which any ranking is possible in each individual’s
preferences satisfying the standard assumptions in economics. By applying
Arrow’s theorem for these three allocations, it can be shown that there exists
a “local dictator” for each free triple. Then, we “connect” free triples in a
suitable way to show that these local dictators must be the same individual.
Turning to IIA-MRS, notice ﬁrst that for each free triple, IIA-MRS works
just as IIAonly in the class of preference proﬁles for which all individuals’
marginal rates of substitution at the three allocations are the same, and
satisfy certain “supporting conditions”. Invoking Arrow’s theorem, we can
only show that there exists a “local dictator” for each free triple in this much
restricted class of preference proﬁles (Lemmas 2 and 3). The diﬃculty in the
proof of Proposition 2 lies in extending “local dictatorship” over the class of
all preference proﬁles. This requires much work to do. See Lemmas 4 and 5
in the Appendix.
Inada [12] also considered marginal rates of substitution in an IIA-like ax-
iom, but the diﬀerence from our work is that he looked for a local aggregator
10of preferences, namely a mapping deﬁning a social marginal rate of substi-
tution between goods and individuals, on the basis of individual marginal
rates of substitution. Hence, Inada requires that, for each allocation, social
preferences in an inﬁnitely small neighborhood of the allocation should not
change whenever every agent’s marginal rates of substitution at the alloca-
tion remain the same. By contrast, our IIA-MRS requires that, for each pair
of allocations, social preferences over that pair should not change whenever
every agent’s marginal rates of substitution at each of the two allocations
remain the same. There is no logical relation between Inada’s axiom and
ours.
The next proposition shows that as soon as one switches from IIA-MRS
to IIA-ISεN, the dictatorship result is avoided, even if ε is arbitrarily small.
However, it remains impossible to achieve Anonymity, even for an arbitrarily
large ε.
Proposition 3 Let ε>0 be given. There exists a SOF that satisﬁes Weak
Pareto, IIA-ISεN, and is not dictatorial. However, there exists no SOF that
satisﬁes Weak Pareto, IIA-ISεN and Anonymity.
Proof. The impossibility part is derived directly from Proposition 5 below,
and here we omit the proof.
We prove the possibility part. Deﬁne ¯ R as follows: x ¯ R(R)y if ei-
ther x1R1y1 and [I(x1,R 1)   Bε(0) or I(y1,R 1)   Bε(0)], or x2R2y2 and
[I(x1,R 1) ⊆ Bε(0) and I(y1,R 1) ⊆ Bε(0)]. For brevity, let Γ(v) denote
[I(v,R1) ⊆ Bε(0)]. Weak Pareto and the absence of dictator are straight-
forwardly satisﬁed. IIA-ISεN is also satisﬁed because when Γ(x1) and Γ(y1)
hold, we have Bε(0) ⊆ Bε(x1) ∩ Bε(y1), and therefore Γ(x1) and Γ(y1) re-
main true if the indiﬀerence surfaces are kept ﬁxed on Bε(x1) and Bε(y1).
It remains to check transitivity of ¯ R(R). First, note the following property:
If Γ(v) holds and vR1v , then Γ(v ) also holds. Assume that there exist
x,y,z ∈ Rn 
+ such that x ¯ R(R)y ¯ R(R)z ¯ P(R)x. If Γ(x1), Γ(y1) and Γ(z1) all
hold, this is impossible because one should have x2R2y2R2z2P2x2. If only
one of the three conditions Γ(x1), Γ(y1), Γ(z1) is satisﬁed, it is similarly im-
possible because one should have x1R1y1R1z1P1x1. Assume Γ(x1) and Γ(y1)
hold, but not Γ(z1). Then, y ¯ R(R)z ¯ P(R)x requires y1R1z1P1x1, which implies
Γ(z1), a contradiction. Assume Γ(x1) and Γ(z1) hold, but not Γ(y1). Then,
x ¯ R(R)y ¯ R(R)z requires x1R1y1R1z1, which implies Γ(y1), a contradiction.
Assume Γ(y1) and Γ(z1) hold, but not Γ(x1). Then, z ¯ P(R)x ¯ R(R)y requires
z1P1x1R1y1, which implies Γ(x1), a contradiction.
11Let us next consider the second direction of extending informational basis,
focusing on indiﬀerence curves “in the Edgeworth box”. The introduction of
such information about indiﬀerence curves, however, cannot help us avoid a
dictatorial SOF.
Proposition 4 If a SOF satisﬁes Weak Pareto and IIA-ISFA, then it is
dictatorial.
The proof relies on the following lemmas. First, we deﬁne a weak form
of IIA:
Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (WIIA): ∀R,R  ∈R n,
∀x,y ∈ X, if ∀i ∈ N, Ri and R 
i agree on {xi,y i}, and for no i, xiIiyi, then
¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R ) agree on {x,y}.
Akey lemma to prove Proposition 4 is the following:
Lemma 2 If a SOF ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Pareto and IIA-ISFA, then it satisﬁes
WIIA.
The proof of this lemma is long and relegated in the appendix. We also
deﬁne a weak form of dictatorship:
Quasi-Dictatorial SOF: ASOF ¯ R is quasi-dictatorial if there exists i0 ∈ N
such that:
∀R ∈R
n,∀x,y ∈ X :[ xi0Pi0yi0 and   ∃i ∈ N with xi Ii yi] ⇒ x ¯ P(R)y.
Lemma 3 If a SOF ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Pareto and Weak IIA, then it is quasi-
dictatorial.
Proof. Let ¯ R be a SOF that satisﬁes Weak Pareto and Weak IIA. By an
adaptation of a standard proof of Arrow’s theorem (for instance, Sen [18]), we
can show that for every free triple Y ⊂ X, there exists a quasi-dictator over
(Y,Rn). Then, a direct application of Bordes and Le Breton [3] establishes
quasi-dictatorship of ¯ R.
It is interesting that in our economic environments, quasi-dictatorship is
equivalent to dictatorship as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 4 If a SOF ¯ R is quasi-dictatorial, then it is dictatorial.
12Proof. Let ¯ R be a quasi-dictatorial SOF. Let x,y ∈ X and R ∈R n be
such that xi0 Pi0 yi0. By continuity and strict monotonicity of preferences,
there exists x  ∈ X such that xi0 Pi0 x 
i0 Pi0 yi0 and for all i ∈ N, either
xi Pi x 
i Pi yi or yi Ri xi Pi x 
i. Since ¯ R is quasi-dictatorial, it follows that
x ¯ P(R) x  and x  ¯ P(R) y. By transitivity, x ¯ P(R) y.
Given these lemmas, the proof of Proposition 4 is straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 4: Let ¯ R be a SOF that satisﬁes Weak Pareto and
IIA-ISFA. By Lemma 2, ¯ R satisﬁes WIIA. Then, by Lemmas 3 and 4, ¯ R is
dictatorial.
The proof of this proposition can be immediately adapted to extend the
result to IIA-ISλEFA.
Combining the ﬁrst and the second extensions of informational ba-
sis amounts to taking indiﬀerence hypersurfaces in some ﬁnitely sized ε-
neighborhoods of allocations as well as in some radial expansion of the
“Edgeworth box”. By this extension, we allow the social ranking of any
two allocations to depend on the shapes of very large portions of indiﬀerence
hypersurfaces around the allocations, and hence the independence condition
becomes very weak. However, incompatibility with anonymity persists no
matter how large the value of ε is.
Proposition 5 Let ε>0 and λ ≥ 1 be given. There exists a SOF that sat-
isﬁes Weak Pareto, IIA-IS[εNλEFA], and is not dictatorial. However, there
exists no SOF that satisﬁes Weak Pareto, IIA-IS[εNλEFA] and Anonymity.
The possibility part is directly implied by Proposition 3 because IIA-
ISεN implies IIA-IS[εNλEFA]. The proof of the impossibility part is in the
appendix.
Going to the third direction of extending informational basis, and fol-
lowing Pazner and Schmeidler’s [16] contribution, we can derive the next
result, which shows that not much information is needed to have an anony-
mous SOF if only we are prepared to accept an externally speciﬁed reference
bundle, although it must be substantially non-local information.
Proposition 6 There exists a SOF that satisﬁes Weak Pareto, IIA-ISPω0
and Anonymity.
13Proof. By continuity and strict monotonicity of preferences, the following
utility functions
ui(xi) = min{α ∈ R+|αω0Rixi}
are well-deﬁned and represent preferences Ri. Let ¯ R be deﬁned by:
x ¯ R(R)y ⇔ min{ui(xi)|i ∈ N}≥min{ui(yi)|i ∈ N}.
This SOF clearly satisﬁes Weak Pareto and Anonymity. It also satisﬁes IIA-
ISPω0 because whenever I(xi,R i) ∩ Λω0 = I(xi,R  
i) ∩ Λω0, we have
min{α ∈ R+|αω0Rixi} = min{α ∈ R+|αω0R
 
ixi}.
Since IIA-ISPω0 implies IIA-WIS, we also have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 There exists a SOF that satisﬁes Weak Pareto, IIA-WIS and
Anonymity.
Notice that we could have the Strong Pareto property2 as well by relying
on the leximin criterion rather than the maximin for the SOF deﬁned in the
above proof. There are also many examples of SOFs satisfying Weak Pareto,
IIA-WIS and Anonymity. Thus, in addition to these three axioms, we may
add other requirements embodying various equity principles.3
4 Conclusion
The construction of a non-dictatorial Arrovian social ordering function, in a
framework with purely ordinal, interpersonally non-comparable preferences,
requires information about the shape of indiﬀerence curves that goes well be-
yond inﬁnitesimally local data such as marginal rates of substitution or data
2Strong Pareto: ∀x,y ∈ Rn 
+ ,∀R ∈R n if ∀i ∈ N, xiRiyi, then x ¯ R(R)y and if, in
addition, ∃i ∈ N, xiPiyi, then x ¯ P(R)y.
3Notice that Strong Pareto and Anonymity already entail a version of the Suppes
grading principle: for all R ∈R n, all x,y, if there are i,j such that Ri = Rj,x iPiyj and
xjPiyi, and for h  = i,j, xh = yh, then x ¯ P(R)y. Notice also that it is easy to construct SOFs
satisfying Strong Pareto, IIA-WIS (or IIA-ISPω0), Anonymity and the following version of
the Hammond equity axiom (Hammond [10]): for all R ∈R n, and all x,y ∈ Rn 
+ , if there
are i,j such that Ri = Rj,y iPixiPixjPiyj, and for all h  = i,j, xh = yh, then x ¯ P(R)y.
14“within the Edgeworth box”. On the basis of information in some ﬁnitely
sized neighborhoods, one can construct a non-dictatorial social ordering func-
tion, but still cannot have an anonymous one. Only substantially non-local
information about indiﬀerence curves enables one to construct a Paretian
and anonymous social ordering function. These are the main messages of
this paper, in which we proved two extensions of Arrow’s impossibility theo-
rem, and several possibility results. We hope that our paper, more broadly,
contributes to clarifying the informational foundations in the theory of social
choice.
There are limits to our work which may be noticed here, and call for
further research. First, we study a particular economic model, and it would
be worth analyzing the same issues in other models such as the standard
abstract model of social choiceor other economic models, in particular models
with public goods (the case of consumption externalities in our model could
also be subsumed under the case of public goods). Second, the information
about indiﬀerence curves is a complex set of object, and our analysis is far
from being exhaustive on the pieces of data which can be extracted from
this set. We have focussed on what seemed to us the most natural parts of
indiﬀerence curves to which one may want to refer in social evaluation of
allocations, namely, the marginal rates of substitution, the Edgeworth box
(bundles which are achievable by redistributing the considered allocations),
and reference rays. But there may be other ways of considering indiﬀerence
curves. For instance, it would be nice to have a measure of the degree to which
a given piece of information is local, and the connection between this work
and topological social choice (e.g. Chichilnisky [6]) might be worth exploring.
Third, there may be other kinds of interesting additional information. For
instance, Roberts [17] considered introducing information about utilities and
about non-local preferences at the same time, and was able to characterize
the Nash social welfare function on this basis. There certainly are many
avenues of research along these lines. The purpose of this paper would be
well-served if it could open the gate towards these enticing avenues.
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17Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 relies on the following lemmas.
Let Y ⊂ X be a given ﬁnite subset of X. Let i ∈ N be given. Deﬁne
Yi = {yi ∈ R 
+|∃ y−i ∈ R
(n−1) 
+ ,(yi,y −i) ∈ Y }. Let Q denote the set of convex
cones in R 
++. For each yi ∈ Yi, let Q(yi) ∈Qbe given. We say that the set
Yi satisﬁes the supporting condition with respect to {Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi} if for all
yi ∈ Yi, all q ∈ Q(yi), and all y 
i ∈ Yi with y 
i  = yi, q · yi <q· y 
i. Deﬁne
R(Yi,{Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi})={Ri ∈R |∀ yi ∈ Yi,C(yi,R i)=Q(yi)}.
The set of all preorderings on Yi is denoted by O(Yi). For any Ri ∈R ,R i|Yi
denotes the restriction of Ri on Yi
4. For any R ⊂R , let R |Yi = {Ri|Yi | Ri ∈
R }. For any xi ∈ X and any Ri ∈R , let U(xi,R i)={ x 
i ∈ X | x 
i Ri xi }
denote the (closed) upper contour set of xi for Ri.
Lemma 5 If a ﬁnite set Yi ⊂ R 
+ satisﬁes the supporting condition with
respect to {Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi}, then R(Yi,{Q(yi)|yi ∈ Yi})|Yi = O(Yi).
Proof. We have only to show that O(Yi) ⊆R (Yi,{Q(yi)|yi ∈ Yi})|Yi. Let R 
∈O (Yi) be any preordering on Yi. Construct a preordering Ri ∈Rso that
the upper contour set of each yi ∈ Yi is deﬁned as follows. Let xi ∈ Yi be
such that for all yi ∈ Yi, yi R 
i xi. Deﬁne Y 1
i = {yi ∈ Yi | yi I 
i xi}. For each
a ∈ R 
+ and each q ∈ R 
++, deﬁne H(a,q)={b ∈ R 












Let I(xi,R i) be the boundary of U(xi,R i). Clearly, for all yi ∈ Y 1
i ,C (yi,R i)
= Q(yi). We also have that for all yi ∈ Yi\Y 1
i , and for all x 
i ∈ I(xi,R i),
yi Pi x 
i. Given δ>0, let (1 + δ)U(xi,R i)={x 
i ∈ R 
+ |∃ ai ∈ U(xi,R i),
x 
i =( 1+δ)ai}, and let (1 + δ)I(xi,R i) be the boundary of (1 +δ)U(xi,R i).
For suﬃciently small δ, we have that for all yi ∈ Yi\Y 1
i , and for all x 
i ∈
4Namely, Ri|Yi is the preordering on Yi such that for all xi,y i ∈ Yi,x i Ri|Yi yi ⇐⇒
xiRiyi.
18(1 + δ)I(xi,R i), yiPix 
i. Let zi ∈ Yi\Y 1
i be such that for all yi ∈ Yi\Y 1
i , yi R 
i
zi. Deﬁne Y 2
i = {yi ∈ Yi\Y 1
i | yi I 
i zi}. Let
















Let I(zi,R i) be the boundary of U(zi,R i). By deﬁnition, for all yi ∈ Y 2
i ,
C(yi,R i)=Q(yi). We have that for all yi ∈ Yi\(Y 1
i ∪ Y 2
i ), and for all x 
i ∈
I(zi,R i),y i Pi x 
i. Similarly we can construct the upper contour set of each
yi ∈ Yi\(Y 1
i ∪ Y 2
i ). By its construction, Ri ∈R (Yi,{Q(yi)|yi ∈ Yi}) and
Ri|Yi = R . Thus, R  ∈R (Yi,{Q(yi)|yi ∈ Yi})|Yi.
Let ¯ R be a social ordering function. Let Y ⊆ X and R  ⊆R n be given.
We say that agent i0 ∈ N is a local dictator for ¯ R over (Y,R ) if for all
x,y ∈ Y , and all R ∈R  , xi0Pi0yi0 implies x ¯ P(R)y.
Lemma 6 Let ¯ R be a social ordering function satisfying Weak Pareto and
IIA-MRS. Let Y ⊂ X be a ﬁnite subset of X such that |Y |≥3.5 Sup-
pose that for all i ∈ N, Yi satisﬁes the supporting condition with respect
to {Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi}. Then, there exists a local dictator i0 ∈ N for ¯ R over
(Y,
 
i∈N R(Yi,{Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi})).
Proof. For all R,R  ∈
 
i∈N R(Yi,{Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi}), all y ∈ Y, and all
i ∈ N, C(yi,R i)=C(yi,R  
i). Since ¯ R satisﬁes IIA-MRS, we have that for all
x,y ∈ Y, and all R,R  ∈
 
i∈N R(Yi,{Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi}), if for all i ∈ N, Ri
and R 
i agree on {xi,y i}, then ¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R ) agree on {x,y}. By Lemma 5,
for all i ∈ N,R(Yi,{Q(yi)|yi ∈ Yi})|Yi = O(Yi). Hence, by Arrow’s Theorem,
there exists a local dictator for ¯ R over (Y,
 
i∈N R(Yi,{Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi})).
We say that a subset Y of X is free for agent i if R|Yi = O(Yi). It is
free if it is free for all i ∈ N. If Y contains two elements, it is a free pair.
If Y contains three elements, it is a free triple. Note that a set {x,y} is a
free pair for i ∈ N if and only if for some k,k  ∈{ 1,···, }, xik >y ik and
yik  >x ik . Given two consumption bundles xi,y i ∈ R 
+, deﬁne xi ∧ yi ∈ R 
+
as (xi ∧ yi)k = min{xik,y ik} for all k ∈{ 1,···, }.
Lemma 7 Let ¯ R be a social ordering function satisfying Weak Pareto and
IIA-MRS. If {x,y}⊂X is a free pair, then there exists a local dictator for
¯ R over ({x,y},Rn).
5Given a set A, |A| denotes the cardinality of A.
19Proof. Let ¯ R be a social ordering function satisfying Weak Pareto and IIA-
MRS. Let {x,y}⊂X be a free pair. Let
K1 = {k ∈{ 1,···, }|xik >y ik}
K2 = {k ∈{ 1,···, }|xik <y ik}
Since {x,y} is a free pair, K1,K 2  = ∅.
Step 1 : For each i ∈ N, we deﬁne two consumption bundles zi,w i ∈ X as
follows:






(xi − xi ∧ yi)+
1
3
(yi − xi ∧ yi)
 
(1)






(xi − xi ∧ yi)+
2
3
(yi − xi ∧ yi)
 
(2)
Figure 1 illustrates the bundles xi,y i,x i ∧ yi,z i,w i, and also bi,v i,t i, which
are deﬁned in the next step. Let q ∈ R 










qk(xik − yik) (3)
Since K1  = ∅, the right-hand-side of (3) can be arbitrarily large as (qk)k∈K1
become large, (qk)k∈K2 being constant. Hence, there exists a price vector
q(yi) ∈ R 
++ that satisﬁes inequality (3). With some calculations, it can be
shown that q(yi) · yi <q (yi) · zi and q(yi) · yi <q (yi) · xi.
Similarly, for each a ∈{ xi,z i,w i}, we can ﬁnd a price vector q(a) ∈ R 
++
such that for all a  ∈{ xi,z i,w i,y i} with a   = a, q(a) · a<q (a) · a . Hence,
the set Y 0
i = {xi,z i,w i,y i} satisﬁes the supporting condition with respect to
{q(xi),q(zi),q(wi),q(yi)}.6
Let z =( zi)i∈N and w =( wi)i∈N. Let Y 0 = {x,z,w,y}.





Step 2: We will show that agent i0 is a local dictator for ¯ R over ({x,y},Rn).
Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists a preference proﬁle R0 ∈R n
such that (i) xi0P0
i0yi0 and y ¯ R(R0)x or (ii) yi0P0
i0xi0 and x ¯ R(R0)y. Without
loss of generality, suppose that (i) holds. Let Y 1 = {z,w,y}. Since agent i0 is




6With a slight abuse of notation, we are writing q(·) for Q(·)={αq(·)| α>0}.




(Otherwise, by Lemma 6, there exists a local dictator j  = i0
for ¯ R over (Y 1,
 
i∈N R(Y 1
i ,{q(zi),q(wi),q(yi)}), and we can con-
struct a preference proﬁle R ∈
 
i∈N R(Y 0
i ,{q(xi),q(zi),q(wi),q(yi)}) ⊂  
i∈N R(Y 1
i ,{q(zi),q(wi),q(yi)}) such that zi0Pi0wi0 and wjPjzj. Hence we
must have z ¯ P(R)w and w ¯ P(R)z, which is a contradiction.)
We deﬁne two allocations v,t ∈ X in the following steps. Let i ∈ N. First,
deﬁne bi ∈ R 
+ as follows: If for all q ∈ C(xi,R 0
i), q · (yi − xi) ≥ 0, then let
bi = yi. If for some q ∈ C(xi,R 0
i), q·(yi−xi) < 0, then let θ>0 be a positive
number such that for all q ∈ C(xi,R 0
i), q·[yi + θ(yi − xi ∧ yi) − xi] > 0. Since
q ∈ R 
++ by strict monotonicity of preferences, and yi − xi ∧ yi > 0, such a
number θ exists. Then, deﬁne bi = yi +θ(yi −xi ∧yi). By deﬁnition, bi >y i,
and for all q ∈ C(xi,R 0
i), q · (bi − xi) > 0. Deﬁne
vi = bi +2 ( bi − xi ∧ yi)
Then, vi >b i >y i, and for all q ∈ C(xi,R 0
i), q · (vi − xi) > 0.
Next, deﬁne






(vi − xi ∧ yi)+
1
3
(wi − xi ∧ yi)
 
Then,
ti = bi +
1
6
(wi − xi ∧ yi) >b i
and for all q ∈ C(xi,R 0
i), q · xi <q· ti.
As in Step 1, we can ﬁnd price vectors q(vi),q(ti) ∈ R 
++ such that q(vi)·
vi <q (vi) · a for all a ∈{ xi,z i,w i,t i}, and q(ti) · ti <q (ti) · a for all a ∈
{xi,z i,w i,v i}.
On the other hand, because vi >y i and ti >y i, we have that q(zi) · zi <
q(zi) · a for all a ∈{ ti,v i}, and q(wi) · wi <q (wi) · a for all a ∈{ ti,v i}.
So far we have shown that
(i) the set Y 1
i = {xi,t i,v i} satisﬁes the supporting condition with respect to
{C(xi,R 0
i),q(ti),q(vi)}.
(ii) the set Y 2
i = {zi,w i,t i,v i} satisﬁes the supporting condition with respect
to {q(zi),q(wi),q(ti),q(vi)}.
Let v =( vi)i∈N and t =( ti)i∈N. Let Y 1 = {x,t,v} and Y 2 =









i ,{q(zi),q(wi),q(ti),q(vi)}). Recall that agent i0 ∈ N is
the local dictator for ¯ R over (Y 0,
 
i∈N R(Y 0
i ,{q(zi),q(wi),q(yi)}). Let R1 ∈
Rn be a preference proﬁle such that for all i ∈ N, C(xi,R 1
i)=C(xi,R 0
i),
and for all ai ∈{ ti,v i,w i,y i,z i}, C(ai,R 1


























i ,{q(zi),q(wi),q(yi)}, and agent i0 is the local dictator
for ¯ R over (Y 0,
 
i∈N R(Y 0




i ,{q(zi),q(wi),q(ti),q(vi)}, this implies that i0 = i2. Hence,





that i0 = i1.
Let R2 ∈R n be a preference proﬁle such that xi0P2
i0vi0 and for all
i ∈ N, R2
i|{xi,yi} = R0





i)={q(vi)} and C(yi,R 2
i)=C(yi,R 0
i). Since agent i0 ∈ N





have that x ¯ P(R2)v. Recall that for all i ∈ N, vi >y i. Hence, by strict
monotonicity of preferences, viP2
i yi for all i ∈ N. Because the social order-
ing function ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Pareto, we have v ¯ P(R2)y. By transitivity of
¯ R, x ¯ P(R2)y. However, since ¯ R satisﬁes IIA-MRS, and y ¯ R(R0)x, we must
have y ¯ R(R2)x. This is a contradiction.
Lemma 8 Let ¯ R be a social ordering function satisfying Weak Pareto and
IIA-MRS. If {x,y,z}⊂X is a free triple, then there exists a local dictator
for ¯ R over ({x,y,z},Rn).
Proof. By Lemma 7, there exist a local dictator i0 over ({x,y},Rn), a local
dictator i1 over ({y,z},Rn), and a local dictator i2 over ({x,z},Rn). Suppose
that i0  = i1. Let R ∈R n be a preference proﬁle such that xi0Pi0yi0,y i1Pi1zi1,
and zi2Pi2xi2. Then, we have x ¯ P(R)y ¯ P(R)z ¯ P(R)x, which contradicts the
transitivity of ¯ R(R). Hence, we must have i0 = i1. By the same argument,
we have i0 = i1 = i2.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let ¯ R be a social ordering function satisfying
Weak Pareto and IIA-MRS. By Lemma 7, for every free pair {x,y}⊂X,
there exists a local dictator over ({x,y},Rn). By Lemma 8 and Bordes and Le
Breton [3, Theorem 2], these dictators must be the same individual. Denote
the individual by i0. It remains to show that for any pair {x,y} that is not
22free, i0 is the local dictator over ({x,y},Rn). Suppose, on the contrary, that
there exist {x,y}⊂X and R ∈R n such that {x,y} is not a free pair, and
xi0Pi0yi0 but y ¯ R(R)x. Deﬁne zi0 ∈ R 
+ as follows.
Case 1: {x,y} is a free pair for i0.
For all λ ∈]0,1[, {λx +( 1− λ)y,x} and {λx +( 1− λ)y,y} are free pairs for
i0. By continuity, there exists λ∗ such that xi0Pi0[λ∗xi0 +( 1− λ∗)yi0]Pi0yi0.
Then, let zi0 = λ∗xi0 +( 1− λ∗)yi0.
Case 2: {x,y} is not a free pair for i0.
Then, for all k ∈{ 1,···, },x i0k ≥ yi0k with at least one strict inequality.
Note that y  =0 .
Case 2-1: There exists k  such that for all k ∈{ 1,···, } with k  = k ,
xi0k = yi0k and yi0k  > 0.
Then, xi0k  >y i0k  > 0. Given ε>0, deﬁne wi0 ∈ R 
+ as wi0k  = yi0k 
and for all k  = k ,w i0k = yi0k + ε. For suﬃciently small ε, we have
xi0Pi0wi0Pi0yi0. Given δ>0, deﬁne ti0 ∈ R 
+ as ti0k  = wi0k  − δ and for
all k  = k ,t i0k = wi0k. For suﬃciently small δ, we have xi0Pi0ti0Pi0yi0. More-
over, {t,x} and {t,y} are free pairs for i0. Then, let zi0 = ti0.
Case 2-2: There exists k  such that for all k ∈{ 1,···, } with k  = k ,
xi0k = yi0k and yi0k  =0 .
Then, for all k ∈{ 1,···, } with k  = k ,x i0k = yi0k > 0. Let k    = k . Given
ε>0, deﬁne wi0 ∈ R 
+ as wi0k   = xi0k   − ε and for all k  = k  ,w i0k = xi0k.
For suﬃciently small ε, we have xi0Pi0wi0Pi0yi0. Given δ>0, deﬁne ti0 ∈ R 
+
as ti0k  = wi0k  + δ and for all k  = k ,t i0k = wi0k. For suﬃciently small δ, we
have xi0Pi0ti0Pi0yi0. Moreover, {t,x} and {t,y} are free pairs for i0. Then,
let zi0 = ti0.
Case 2-3: There exist k ,k    ∈{ 1,···, } with k   = k  ,x i0k  >y i0k  and
xi0k   >y i0k  .
Let k∗ be such that yi0k∗ > 0. Given ε>0, deﬁne wi0 ∈ R 
+ as wi0k∗ =
yi0k∗ − ε and for all k  = k∗,w i0k = xi0k. For suﬃciently small ε, we have
xi0Pi0wi0Pi0yi0. Let k∗∗  = k∗. Given δ>0, deﬁne ti0 ∈ R 
+ as ti0k∗∗ = wi0k∗∗+δ
and for all k  = k∗∗,t i0k = wi0k. For suﬃciently small δ, we have xi0Pi0ti0Pi0yi0.
Moreover, {t,x} and {t,y} are free pairs for i0. Then, let zi0 = ti0.
Next, for each i  = i0, let zi ∈ R 
+ be such that {z,x} and {z,y} are free
pairs for i. By the same construction as above, we can ﬁnd such zi ∈ R 
+
for each i. Let z =( zi)i∈N ∈ Rn 
+ . Since i0 is the dictator over all free pairs,
we have that x ¯ P(R)z and z ¯ P(R)y. By transitivity of ¯ R, we have x ¯ P(R)y,
which contradicts the supposition that y ¯ R(R)x.
23A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
To prove Lemma 2, we need an auxiliary lemma. Deﬁne
X1 = {xi ∈ R
 
+ \{ 0}|∀ k ≥ 2,x ik =0 }
X2 = {xi ∈ R
 
+ \{ 0}|∀ k  =2 ,x ik =0 }.
Lemma 9 For all Ri ∈R , and all x,y ∈ X, there exists R∗
i ∈Rsuch that
I(xi,R i) ∩ Ω(x,y)=I(xi,R
∗
i) ∩ Ω(x,y)





i) ∩ X1  = ∅
I(yi,R
∗
i) ∩ X1  = ∅
Proof. Let Ri ∈Rand x,y ∈ X be given. Without loss of generality, assume













where we recall that H(a,q)={b ∈ R 
+ | q · b ≥ q · a}. Let I(xi,R ∗
i) be the
boundary of U(xi,R ∗
i).
Deﬁne a function g : A → R+ as follows: For every a ∈ A,i f( a1 +
1,0,...,0) Pi a, then let g(a) = 0, and otherwise, let g(a) be such that
(a1 +1 ,g(a)a2,...,g(a)a ) Ii a. By strict monotonicity of Ri, g(a) < 1.
By continuity of Ri, g is continuous. For every a ∈ A, let b(a)=( a1 +













Since b(a) Ri a, it follows that for every q ∈ C(a,Ri), q · b(a) ≥ q · a, and so
q · f(a) ≥ q · a. Hence, f(a) ∈ H(a,q).
The function f is continuous, and the set A is compact and nonempty.
Hence, the set f(A) is compact and nonempty. Therefore, there exists a∗ ∈ A






. Then, for all
24a ∈ A, and all q ∈ C(a,Ri), since f(a) ∈ H(a,q) and f(a∗) ≥ f(a), we have
f(a∗) ∈ H(a,q). Thus, f(a∗) ∈ U(xi,R ∗
i), which proves that U(xi,R ∗
i)∩X1  =
∅ and I(xi,R ∗
i) ∩ X1  = ∅.



















i) ∩ (1 + δ)U(xi,R
∗
i)
Then, let I(yi,R ∗
i) be the boundary of ˜ U(yi,R ∗
i). Note that I(xi,R ∗
i) ∩
I(yi,R ∗
i)=∅. Asimilar argument as above shows that U(yi,R ∗
i) ∩ X1  = ∅.
Since U(xi,R ∗
i) ∩ X1  = ∅, we have [(1 + δ)U(xi,R ∗
i)] ∩ X1  = ∅. Thus,
˜ U(yi,R ∗
i) ∩ X1  = ∅ and I(yi,R ∗
i) ∩ X1  = ∅.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Let R,R  ∈R n,x , y∈ X be such that for all i ∈ N, Ri and R 
i agree on
{xi,y i}, and for no i ∈ N, xi Ii yi. Assume that x ¯ P(R)y.
By Lemma 9, there exists R∗ ∈R n such that for all i ∈ N,
I(xi,R i) ∩ Ω(x,y)=I(xi,R
∗
i) ∩ Ω(x,y)





i) ∩ X1  = ∅
I(yi,R
∗
i) ∩ X1  = ∅,










i ) ∩ Ω(x,y)
I(xi,R
 ∗
i ) ∩ X2  = ∅
I(yi,R
 ∗
i ) ∩ X2  = ∅.
Deﬁne x1,y1 ∈ Xn
1 by {x1
i} = I(xi,R ∗
i) ∩ X1 and {y1
i } = I(yi,R ∗
i) ∩ X1
for all i ∈ N. Notice that for all i ∈ N, x1
i1 > 0,y 1
i1 > 0 because x,y ∈ X
25and preferences are strictly monotonic. Construct x1∗,y1∗ ∈ Xn
1 as follows:
























































Now, deﬁne x2,y2 ∈ Xn
2 by {x2
i} = I(xi,R  ∗
i )∩X2 and {y2
i} = I(yi,R  ∗
i )∩
X2 for all i ∈ N. Again, x2
i2 > 0,y 2
i2 > 0 for all i ∈ N. Construct x2∗,y2∗ ∈ Xn
2





























































By Weak Pareto, x ¯ P(R ∗)x2∗ and y2∗ ¯ P(R ∗)y.













































26Therefore, by IIA-ISFA, x1∗ ¯ P(R∗∗)y1∗. By Weak Pareto, x2∗ ¯ P(R∗∗)x1∗ and
y1∗ ¯ P(R∗∗)y2∗, so that by transitivity, x2∗ ¯ P(R∗∗)y2∗.



































We have proved that x ¯ P(R)y implies x ¯ P(R )y,. It follows from symmetry
of the argument that y ¯ P(R)x implies y ¯ P(R )x, and that x¯ I(R)y implies
x¯ I(R )y.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
In order to prove the impossibility part, it is convenient to consider various
possible sizes of the population. Let ε>0 and λ ≥ 1 be given. Suppose,
to the contrary, that there exists a SOF ¯ R that satisﬁes Weak Pareto, IIA-
IS[εNλEFA] and Anonymity.
Case n =2 . Consider the consumption bundles x = (10ε,(2ε)/(2λ),0,...),
y = (20ε,(2ε)/(2λ),0,...),z = ((2ε)/(2λ),20ε,0,...),w =
((2ε)/(2λ),10ε,0,...). Let preference relations R1 ∈Rand R2 ∈Rbe
deﬁned as follows.
(i) On the subset
S1 = {v ∈ R
 
+ |∀ i ∈{ 3,..., },v i = 0 and v2 ≤ min{v1,2ε}}
we have
vR 1 v





and on the subset
S2 = {v ∈ R
 
+ |∀ i ∈{ 3,..., },v i = 0 and v1 ≤ min{v2,2ε}},
we have
vR 1 v





27(ii) On Bε(x) ∪ Bε(y),
vR 1 v
  ⇔ v1 +2 v2 +












and on Bε(z) ∪ Bε(w),
vR 1 v
  ⇔ 2v1 + v2 +












(iii) Note that the projection of Bε(x)∪Bε(y) on the subspace of good 1 and
good 2, namely, [Bε(x) ∪ Bε(y)] ∩{ v ∈ R 
+ : | : ∀i ∈{ 3,..., },v i =0 },i s
included in S1, and the projection of Bε(z)∪Bε(w) on the subspace of good
1 and good 2 is included in S2. Since
[w1 +( 2 ε − w1)] + 2[w2 − 2(2ε − w1)] >x 1 +2 x2
and
2[y1 − 2(2ε − y2)] + [y2 +( 2 ε − y2)] > 2z1 + z2,
it is possible to complete the deﬁnition of R1 so that wP 1 x and yP 1 z.
Then, deﬁne R2 so that it coincides with R1 on S1,o nS2, and on Bε(a) for
all a ∈{ x,y,z,w}. Similarly, it is possible to complete the deﬁnition of R2
so that xP 2 w and zP 2 y. Figure 2 illustrates this construction (for λ = 1).
If the proﬁle of preferences is R =( R1,R 2), by Weak Pareto we have
(y,x) ¯ P(R)(z,w) and (w,z) ¯ P(R)(x,y).
If the proﬁle of preferences is R  =( R1,R 1), by Anonymity we have
(y,x)¯ I(R
 )(x,y) and (w,z)¯ I(R
 )(z,w).
Notice that λΩ(x,y) ⊆ S1 ∪ S2 and λΩ(z,w) ⊆ S1 ∪ S2. Since R1 and R2
coincide on S1,o nS2, and on Bε(a) for all a ∈{ x,y,z,w}, it follows from
IIA-IS[εNλEFA] that
(y,x)¯ I(R
 )(x,y) ⇔ (y,x)¯ I(R)(x,y)
and (w,z)¯ I(R
 )(z,w) ⇔ (w,z)¯ I(R)(z,w).
By transitivity, (x,y) ¯ P(R)(x,y), which is impossible.
28Case n =3 . Consider the consumption bundles x =
(10ε,(2ε)/(3λ),0,...),y= (20ε,(2ε)/(3λ),0,...),t= (15ε,(2ε)/(3λ),0,...),
z = ((2ε)/(3λ),20ε,0,...),w = ((2ε)/(3λ),10ε,0,...),r =
((2ε)/(3λ),15ε,0,...). Let preference relations R1, R2 and R3 be deﬁned as
above on the subset S1,o nS2, and on Bε(a) for all a ∈{ x,y,z,w,t,r}.An d
complete their deﬁnitions so that yP1z, wP1x, tP2r, zP2y, xP3w, rP3t.
If the proﬁle of preferences is R =( R1,R 2,R 3), by Weak Pareto we have
(y,t,x) ¯ P(R)(z,r,w) and (w,z,r) ¯ P(R)(x,y,t).
If the proﬁle of preferences is R  =( R1,R 1,R 1), by Anonymity we have
(y,t,x)¯ I(R
 )(x,y,t) and (w,z,r)¯ I(R
 )(z,r,w).
Notice that λΩ(x,y,t) ⊆ S1∪S2 and λΩ(z,w,r) ⊆ S1∪S2. Since R1,R 2 and
R3 coincide on S1,o nS2, and on Bε(a) for all a ∈{ x,y,t,z,w,r}, it follows
from IIA-IS[εNλEFA] that
(y,t,x)¯ I(R
 )(x,y,t) ⇔ (y,t,x)¯ I(R)(x,y,t)
and (w,z,r)¯ I(R
 )(z,r,w) ⇔ (w,z,r)¯ I(R)(z,r,w).
By transitivity, (x,y,t)¯ P(R)(x,y,t), which is impossible.
Case n =2 k. Partition the population into k pairs, and construct an
argument similar to the case n =2 , with the consumption bundles x =
(10ε,(2ε)/(nλ),0,...),y= (20ε,(2ε)/(nλ),0,...),z= ((2ε)/(nλ),20ε,0,...),
w = ((2ε)/(nλ),10ε,0,...), and the allocations (y,x,y,x,...), (x,y,x,y,...),
(z,w,z,w,...) and (w,z,w,z,...).
Case n =2 k +1 . Partition the population into k − 1 pairs and
one triple, and construct an argument combining the cases n = 2 and
n =3 , with the consumption bundles x = (10ε,(2ε)/(nλ),0,...),y=
(20ε,(2ε)/(nλ),0,...),t= (15ε,(2ε)/(nλ),0,...),z= ((2ε)/(nλ),20ε,0,...),
w = ((2ε)/(nλ),10ε,0,...),r = ((2ε)/(nλ),15ε,0,...), and the allo-






































Figure 1: Proof of Lemma 7
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Figure 2: Proof of Proposition 5
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